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THE ASEAN-CHINA FREE TRADE AREA 




On July 1, 2005, a pivotal agreement on trade in goods1 between 
China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations2 (ASEAN) 
took effect.  The implementation of this free trade agreement marked 
the beginning of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (ACFTA), 
which is expected to become the world’s largest trading bloc.3  Most 
notably, ACFTA will surpass the free trade areas created by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European 
Union (EU) in terms of population.  Upon completion, ACFTA will 
encompass an economic region with 1.7 billion consumers, a regional 
GDP of about $2 trillion, and total annual trade volume of approxi-
mately $1.23 trillion.4 
ACFTA’s sheer size alone is sufficient to merit further analysis.  
When coupled with China’s economic rise and World Trade Organi-
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 1. Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Re-
public of China , Nov. 29, 2004, PRC-ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm 
(last visited Sep. 30, 2005).  
 2. ASEAN is a regional organization comprising the ten Southeast Asian Nations: Brunei, 
Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vie t-
nam. 
 3. Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, The Logic of China -ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of 
“Peaceful Ascendancy”, in CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: GLOBAL CHANGES AND REGIONAL 
CHALLENGES 17, 26 (Ho Khai Leong & Samuel C.Y. Ku eds., 2005). 
 4. ASEAN-CHINA EXPERT GROUP ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, FORGING CLOSER 
ASEAN-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (2001),  available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/newdata/asean_chi.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).  
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zation (WTO) accession, ACFTA has the potential to significantly 
impact the WTO-led multilateral trade system.5 
Most importantly, ACFTA serves as a tangible reminder of 
China’s growing influence in East Asia.6  While the rise of China has 
prompted significant debate and research, little attention has been 
paid to ACFTA, particularly in the legal field.  Instead, most of the 
scholarship on ACFTA has focused exclusively on economic and 
geopolitical issues, despite the fact that creation of a free trade area is 
also a legal process.7 
Furthermore, one of the greatest impediments to ACFTA’s long-
term success is ASEAN’s lack of a sufficient legal structure, namely a 
capable dispute resolution mechanism.  Hence, the success of this 
groundbreaking free trade area may depend on whether ASEAN as 
an organization undergoes the legal reform necessary for the imple-
mentation of ACFTA.  A similar question has often been posed with 
respect to China and its evolving trade regime: can China undergo 
sufficient legal reform to meet its WTO obligations?8  Yet, few studies 
have focused on ASEAN and its ability, or lack thereof, to implement 
and legally enforce its own trade ambitions. 
Thus, this Note will focus on the relatively overlooked issue of 
whether ACFTA will succeed despite ASEAN’s nascent legalism.  To 
provide the fullest understanding of ACFTA, this note will also re-
view the many geopolitical hurdles to ACFTA’s success.  A free trade 
area of this magnitude involving only developing countries would be 
ambitious for any region.  In particular, the troubled history of Chi-
 
 5. For a discussion of the relationship between ACFTA and WTO, see generally, Qingji-
ang Kong, China’s WTO Accession and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: The Perspective of 
a Chinese Lawyer, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 839 (2004). 
 6. See Wang, supra note 3, at 17-19. 
 7. Jeffrey A. Kaplan, ASEAN’s Rubicon: A Dispute Settlement Mechanism for AFTA, 14 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 147, 148  (1996):  
Free trade, now closely linked to ASEAN’s economic emergence, has captured the 
imagination and enmity of national policymakers and scholars alike.  The free trade 
debate, however, is typically confined to its economic and geopolitical underpinnings.  
Parallel legal developments, crucial to the efficacy of any free trade agreement, are 
mainly ignored even though the process of defining a free trade area and eliminating 
trade barriers is, in large part, a legal process. 
 8. See, e.g., Sibao Shen, WTO and China’s Legal System, in WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 267, 268-71 (Mitsuo Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn eds., 2004) (“Therefore, 
China’s accession into the WTO is more than a matter of economic and trade concerns (not just 
like Japan and Brazil who have adjusted their social and legal systems to the western style), it is 
really a true challenge to China’s current system and her adjustability, especially in the case of 
administrative and legal regimes.”). 
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nese-ASEAN relations casts significant doubt vis-à-vis the long-term 
feasibility of ACFTA. 
Part II of this Note will provide some background regarding the 
motivations, origins, and current status of ACFTA, and Part III will 
examine the history of the Sino-ASEAN relationship since ASEAN’s 
formation.  Part IV will analyze ASEAN’s current legal structure, 
while Part V will discuss ASEAN’s attempt to create an intra-
ASEAN free trade area and the legal institutionalization that has re-
sulted from this initiative.  In Part VI, this Note will turn to a discus-
sion of two key geopolitical hurdles to ACFTA’s success: the lack of 
cohesion in ASEAN and competition between ASEAN and China.  
Finally, Part VII will include some basic remarks about an issue that 
should be the focus of future research: ACFTA’s likely effect on the 
WTO and other nations with considerable influence in East Asia. 
I.  ASEAN-CHINA FREE TRADE AREA: MOTIVATIONS, 
ORIGINS, AND CURRENT STATUS 
A. Motivations 
The rise of China has prompted frequent discussion and concern 
in the United States.9  Much of this discussion has focused on the fu-
ture economic and security threat China may pose to the United 
States.  In contrast, for the ASEAN member states, China’s growing 
status as a global power is not a future challenge but a daily reality.10 
In particular, the significant growth of Sino-ASEAN trade and 
Chinese investment in the ASEAN member states has increased 
these nations’ dependence on the emerging superpower.11  This in-
creasing dependence coupled with the security threat that China 
poses predominantly in the South China Sea, makes the “China ques-
 
 9. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Does the Future Belong to China?, NEWSWEEK, May 9, 2005, 
at 26 (“[China] is a country whose scale dwarfs the United States—1.3 billion people, four times 
America’s population. . . . But now the very size and scale that seemed so alluring is beginning 
to look ominous.  And Americans are wondering whether the ‘China threat’ is nightmarishly 
real.”);  see also, Robert W. Radtke, China’s “Peaceful Rise” Overshadowing U.S. Influence in 
Asia?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 8, 2003, at 9; see generally , ROSS TERRILL, THE 
NEW CHINESE EMPIRE: AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE UNITED STATES  (2003). 
 10. Jong Wong, The Rise of China: Challenges for the ASEAN Economies, in CHINA’S 
POST-JIANG LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 355, 363 (Jong Wong & 
Zheng Yongnian eds., 2002) (“[T]he rise of China’s economy can disrupt its neighboring 
economies, especially in the short run.  This is particularly so for the ASEAN economies.”). 
 11. See Wang, supra  note 3, at 31 (noting that ASEAN’s total trade with China in 2004 
amounted to $78.3 billion). 
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tion” a pressing issue for Southeast Asia.  As stated by the director of 
a leading Southeast Asian research center, “[f]or better or worse, the 
rise of China is a development we can ill afford to ignore.”12 
However, while China’s economic rise at the end of the Cold 
War was viewed primarily as a “threat” by its neighbors and the 
United States, China’s continued rise has recently begun to be viewed 
more as an opportunity.13  Beijing has worked hard to cultivate such a 
view.  On several recent occasions, China has suggested to its 
neighbors that its own ascendancy would not hurt the region but 
would actually provide many benefits.14  For example, when Premier 
Wen Jiabao appeared at the 2003 China-ASEAN summit, he argued 
that China’s ascendancy should be seen as a “win-win” situation.15  
Later, in a visit to Harvard University, the Premier emphasized that 
China subscribed to the idea of “heping-jueqi” which literally means 
“peaceful rise.”16 
Certainly, there are indicators that ASEAN is beginning to view 
China’s rise more favorably.  At least one scholar has suggested that 
the creation of ACFTA symbolizes recognition by the ASEAN states 
that China’s burgeoning economy is no longer a threat.17  However, 
other scholars have suggested the contrary: ASEAN has pushed 
ACFTA because it still views China as a threat and ACFTA is the 
most appropriate response.18 
Whether or not ACFTA is a response to the China threat, it is 
not surprising that ASEAN has supported the creation of this free 
trade area.  In fact, ASEAN is still trying to fully implement an intra-
 
 12. K. Kesavapany , Forward, DEVELOPING ASEAN -CHINA RELATIONS: REALITIES AND 
PROSPECTS—A BRIEF REPORT ON THE ASEAN-CHINA FORUM, at vii (Singapore: Institution 
of Southeast Asian Studies 2004). 
 13. Id. at 4; see also Wang, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that ASEAN member states see 
closer integration with China in the form of an FTA as a method of gaining personally from 
China’s growing prosperity).  
 14. See, e.g., Kesavapany, supra note 12, at 4. 
 15. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China Aiming for a Peaceful Rise , CNN, Feb. 6, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/02/willy.column/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 
2005). 
 16. See Wang, supra note 3, at 32. 
 17. Kong, supra  note 5, at 841-42. 
 18. See Wang, supra note 3, at 26 (“Size is important, and China towers over each individ-
ual ASEAN member and all of them combined . . . . This is why there is a widely accepted view, 
expressed by former Singaporean Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo, that an integrated 
ASEAN is the only viable response to an economically-rising China.”).  
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ASEAN free trade area called “AFTA.”19  From an economic per-
spective, any free trade area provides many benefits to the ASEAN 
states as it allows them to “overcome the disadvantage of smallness 
by pooling resources and combining markets.”20 
China’s motives, however, are less evident.21  As has been sug-
gested, ACFTA may be China’s way of preempting other powers’ 
dominance of Asia.  For example, as Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang sug-
gests, China can use ACFTA to defuse American influence in the re-
gion and to:  
[C]ultivate goodwill among China’s important neighbours, maintain 
peace and security. . .and secure key markets and raw materials 
needed for China’s economic security.  It is thus a sine qua non of 
“peaceful ascendancy” — the fundamental strategy of China’s new 
diplomacy for survival and development.22 
B. Origins 
The idea of a free trade area between China and ASEAN was 
first proposed by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji at the November 2000 
China-ASEAN summit.23  In October 2001, the China-ASEAN Ex-
pert Group on Economic Cooperation issued an official report rec-
ommending a “WTO-consistent ASEAN-China FTA within ten 
years.”24  A month later, at the November 2001 China-ASEAN sum-
mit, the relevant leaders endorsed the ideas of the Expert Group and 
the negotiation process officially commenced.25  Then, at the Eighth 
China-ASEAN Summit in November 2002, the ASEAN leaders and 
Chinese Premier Zhu Ronjgi signed the “Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation”26 (ACFTA Framework 
 
 19. ASEAN’s difficulties in establishing an intra-ASEAN free trade area further discussed 
infra at Part V. 
 20. John Wong & Sarah Chen, China -ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, ASIAN SURV. 507, 
508 (2003). 
 21. See Wang Jiang Yu, The Legal and Policy Considerations of China -ASEAN FTA: The 
Impact on the Multilateral Trading System, in CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: GLOBAL 
CHANGES AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES 42,  43 (Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C.Y. Ku eds., 
2005).  
 22. Wang, supra note 3, at 34. 
 23. Wong & Chen, supra note 20, at 507. 
 24. ASEAN-CHINA EXPERT GROUP ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, supra note 4, at 36. 
 25. Wang, supra  note 21, at 45. 
 26. Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, PRC-ASEAN, Nov. 
5, 2002, available at http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005) [hereinafter 
ACFTA Framework Agreement]. 
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Agreement).  This agreement has served as a roadmap for the devel-
opment of the free trade area.  As laid out in the ACFTA Framework 
Agreement, a free trade area covering trade in goods between China 
and the original six ASEAN members is to be completed by 2010.27  
The remaining four ASEAN members are expected to fully join by 
2015.28  The ACFTA Framework Agreement is a groundbreaking 
document, for while individual ASEAN members had previously cre-
ated free trade agreements, ASEAN as an organization had never be-
fore made such a pact with an outside nation. 
Moreover, the ACFTA Framework Agreement was China’s first 
free trade agreement with a foreign nation.29  Since the ACFTA 
Framework Agreement, both China and ASEAN have entered into 
negotiations with other countries regarding free trade agreements. 
C. ACFTA’S Current Status 
In January 2004, ACFTA’s “Early Harvest-Programme” (EHP) 
commenced.  The purpose of the Early Harvest Programme is to fa-
cilitate the reduction of tariffs before ACFTA is fully implemented.  
One of the most interesting aspects of EHP is that it is almost entirely 
one-sided, with China making the immediate concessions.  As EHP 
has been described, “it allows ASEAN products to be exported to 
China at a very concessionary rate so that ASEAN countries can ac-
tually get the benefits of a free trade agreement even before the 
agreement is realized.”30  In return for China’s concessions to the 
ASEAN members under the EHP, China gets some tariff reductions 
for certain agricultural products.31 
One of the most critical aspects of EHP is that it was negotiated 
on a bilateral basis between China and the individual ASEAN mem-
bers.32  Since the ASEAN members were unable to reach consensus 
amongst themselves, China negotiated individually with each 
 
 27. Id. art. 8. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Wang Jiang Yu, supra note 21, at 45 (emphasizing that while China has had agreements 
with Hong Kong and the other semi-autonomous Chinese territories, never before had China 
signed an agreement with an entirely “foreign” nation). 
 30. Id. at 46 (quoting Malaysia Early Harvest Clause a Way Out for RB, MANILA TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2003). 
 31. See id. (noting that these agricultural products include meat, fish, fruit, vegetables and 
milk). 
 32. Id. at 47. 
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ASEAN member.33  The Philippines was the last country to enter the 
EHP, as recently as May 2005. 
Another crucial aspect of EHP is that, by granting ASEAN 
members access to certain markets not currently open to WTO mem-
bers, it gives the ASEAN members a “first mover” advantage over 
other WTO members.34  In other words, because sectors of the Chi-
nese economy remain closed to foreign companies, the ASEAN 
members will benefit as their companies will be the first to enter new 
Chinese markets. 
II.  THE SINO-ASEAN RELATIONSHIP IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
When ASEAN was founded in 1967, the news of its formation 
was not well received by China.35  Although the Bangkok Declara-
tion, ASEAN’s founding document, sets forth seven overarching aims 
that focus primarily on political and economic cooperation,36 China 
originally viewed ASEAN as a military association with anti-Chinese 
aims.37  China’s view of ASEAN as anti-Chinese was not entirely an 
overreaction.  Indeed, while relations between China and most 
Southeast Asian nations had traditionally been benign, they rapidly 
declined throughout the 1960s.38  By 1967, the Cold War and specific 
Chinese policies had created an aura of distrust between China and 
its southern neighbors.39  In particular, Chinese support for commu-
nist groups within several Southeast Asian states reinforced Southeast 
Asian distrust and suspicion of the PRC.40  Hence, when the Bangkok 
Declaration was signed, none of the original five ASEAN members 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Maghaisvarei Sellakumaran, WTO at the Crossroads and the Road Ahead for ASEAN , 
in ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2004-2005  52,  54 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). 
 35. KHAW GUAT HOON, AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S ATTITUDES TOWARD ASEAN: 1967-
1976  5 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977) (noting that ASEAN was referred to as a 
“counter-revolutionary alliance” and an “instrument of U.S. imperialism”).  
 36. ASEAN Declaration [Bangkok Declaration], Aug. 8, 1967, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
 37. HOON, supra note 35, at 5-6.  (“[T]his reactionary association formed in the name of 
economic co-operation is a military alliance directly specifically against China.”) (quoting 10 
PEKING REVIEW, Aug. 18, 1967, at 40). 
 38. See Alice D. Ba, China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21 st-Century Asia , 43 
ASIAN SURV. 622, 623 (2003). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See JÜRGEN HAACKE, ASEAN’S DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY CULTURE: ORIGINS, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND PROSPECTS 113 (2003). 
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(Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) had 
normal relations with China.41 
However, as the United States’ relations with China began to 
improve, ASEAN members became more open to the idea of normal-
izing relations with China.42  Moreover, with the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, China became more interested in forming relationships 
with other “third world” countries.43 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines were the first ASEAN 
nations to resume diplomatic relations with China between 1974 and 
1975.44  Singapore developed a trade relationship although it did not 
officially normalize relations until 1990.45  And although Indonesia 
also refused to normalize relations until 1990, it still accepted limited 
commercial interaction beginning in 1985 when it signed a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) with China.46  However, this docu-
ment was intended to be “unofficial” and did not even contain the 
names of either country.47  Nevertheless, despite its unofficial and le-
gally-lacking nature, Indonesia’s MOU with China led to the resump-
tion of direct trade between the two countries.48 
Meanwhile, as the United States began to withdraw from the re-
gion, demonstrated particularly by its minimal response to Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia, many ASEAN members recognized the need 
to deepen relations with China.49  However, the founding ASEAN 
members could not agree on how relations with China should de-
velop.50  As Alice Ba has described, the ASEAN states “differed, 
mostly, over whether China or Vietnam constituted the larger threat 
 
 41. Ba, supra note 38, at 624. 
 42. See id. 
 43. HOON, supra note 35, at 30. 
 44. Chia Siow-Yue, China’s Economic Relations with ASEAN Countries, in ASEAN  AND 
CHINA: AN EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP 189, 194-95 (Joyce K. Kallgren et. al. eds., 1988). 
 45. Id. at 195 (noting that, while Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand established dip-
lomatic tie s with China between 1974-1975, Singapore only had an exchange of commercial re p-
resentatives); see also Ong Keng Yong, Securing a Win-Win Partnership for ASEAN and China , 
in ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: REALITIES AND PROSPECTS 19, 20 (Saw Swee-Hock et. al. eds., 
2005) (noting that Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam all normalized relations with 
China in 1990). 
 46. Hadi Soesastro, Indonesia-China Relations, in ASEAN  AND CHINA: AN EVOLVING 
RELATIONSHIP 217,  219-21 (Joyce K. Kallgren et. al. eds., 1988); see also Ong, supra note 44. 
 47. Id. at 220. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Ba, supra note 38, at 625. 
 50. Id. at 625-26. 
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to ASEAN security.”51  Nevertheless, as ASEAN fumbled to find a 
solution to the Vietnam issue, China viewed closer relations with 
ASEAN as a useful step in its process of economic reform.52  Hence, 
in 1978, Deng Xiaoping took a tour of Southeast Asia to develop 
support for China’s economic reforms.53  Furthermore, between 1970 
and 1985, two-way trade between China and ASEAN member na-
tions grew from $0.2 billion to $4.2 billion.54 
By 1991, all of the ASEAN members had normalized relations 
with China.55  Meanwhile, relations between ASEAN and the United 
States were declining.56  While the United States remained ASEAN’s 
main extra-regional ally, the ASEAN members began to realize they 
might need to find alternative political-security arrangements: “eco-
nomic growth and growing trade tensions contributed to a greater 
willingness to explore alternative arrangements.”57 
From the Chinese viewpoint, normalizing relations and increas-
ing cooperation with ASEAN was beneficial as the ASEAN members 
provided potential investors and political allies.58  However, even as 
economic cooperation was increasing, China consistently rejected ef-
forts at regional military cooperation.  The main source of contention 
was China’s actions in the South China Sea with respect to the Spratly 
Islands.59  This ongoing dispute focuses on a group of islands in the 
southern part of the South China Sea which are now claimed by six 
nations: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philip-
pines.  In 1992, the ASEAN foreign ministers crafted a legal response 
to this dilemma by adopting the ASEAN Declaration on the South 
China Sea, which emphasized in the Preamble, “the necessity to re-
solve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South 
 
 51. Id. at 625. 
 52. See Chia Siow-Yue, supra  note 44, at 195-96. 
 53. See Ba, supra note 38, at 626. 
 54. Chia Siow-Yue, supra  note 44, at 207. 
 55. Ba, supra note 38, at 627. 
 56. Id. at 627. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 632 (noting that China began to view its relationship with the ASEAN members 
as so significant that it actually referred to the re -opening of diplomatic relations with Indonesia 
as “a breakthrough progress in China’s diplomatic field”).  
 59. AMITAV ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
ASEAN AND THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ORDER 133  (2001) (“The Spratlys dispute is widely 
viewed by ASEAN governments as the major ‘flashpoint of conflict’ in post-Cold War South-
east Asia.”). 
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China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force.”60  Finally, in 
2002 after years of negotiation, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi signed an agreement derived from the 1992 Declaration entitled 
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.”61  
Just as ACFTA is considered the economic pillar of Sino-ASEAN re-
lations, this non-binding declaration is considered the security pillar 
of this relationship.  The Declaration calls on all parties to resolve all 
territorial and jurisdictional disputes “by peaceful means.”62 
III.  THE ROAD TO LEGALISM 
A. An Introduction to the “ASEAN Way” 
Decision making and lawmaking within ASEAN is conducted 
through what is known as the “ASEAN way.”  The ASEAN way is 
ASEAN’s trademark: a phrase that is used to describe ASEAN’s 
unique consensus approach.  The ASEAN way is steeped in the his-
tory and culture of the region.  It is derived from the Malaysian con-
cepts of “musjawarah” and “mufukat.”63  “Musjawarah” refers to the 
process of decision-making through consultation and discussion, while 
“mufukat” refers to the unanimous decision that is achieved through 
musjawarah.  As described by Paul Davidson, the ASEAN way: 
[I]nvolves processes including intensive informal and discreet dis-
cussions behind the scenes to work out a general consensus which 
then acts as the starting point around which the unanimous decision 
is finally accepted in more formal meetings, rather than across-the-
table negotiations involving bargaining and give-and-take that re-
sult in deals enforceable in a court of law. 64 
Thus, the ASEAN way is fundamental in shaping every aspect of this 
regional organization.  Not only are meetings conducted through the 
consensus approach, but the resulting regulations and agreements re-
flect this consensus style.  Indeed, most ASEAN documents reflect 
this kind of “soft” law.  Consequently, agreements generally do not 
contain many legally-binding provisions but rather consist of a set of 
very broad principles. 
 
 60. ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (July 22, 1992), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/1196.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). 
 61. Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea  (Nov. 4, 2002), PRC-
ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
 62. Id. art. 4. 
 63. SHAUN NARINE, EXPLAINING ASEAN: REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 31 (2002). 
 64. Paul J. Davidson, The ASEAN Way and Role of Law in ASEAN Economic Coopera-
tion, 8 S.Y.B.I.L.  165, 167 (2004). 
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The ASEAN way may indeed be reflective of an Asia-wide ap-
proach to law.65  As Shin-yi Peng describes, “[a]mbiguity is almost an 
art form; it is viewed as a useful device in mitigating conflict and 
building common positions and confidence. . . Asians tend to avoid 
legalism and emphasize group ‘harmony’ and consensus.”66  Hence, 
when consensus cannot be reached on a particular issue, the flexible 
ASEAN way allows the member states to push aside the controversial 
issue so that they can discuss other matters.67  It is likely because of 
this flexibility that the organization has been able to survive during 
very contentious times. 
The ASEAN way can be viewed as a rejection of the formal le-
galism of international institutions.68  Yet, even the current ASEAN 
Secretary-General has suggested that ASEAN needs to reform its le-
gal structure—particularly its economic laws—to bring them more 
into line with international norms: 
As ASEAN engages in more and more economic cooperation 
schemes, both among its own Member Countries and with partners 
outside of Southeast Asia, ASEAN has to become increasingly le-
galistic.  Economic agreements have to be implemented with a high 
degree of certainty.  When disputes arise, there must be some effi-
cient process to settle them amicably and fairly. 69 
Thus, while ASEAN has been able to survive without significant legal 
institutionalization, ASEAN must undergo legal reform for ACFTA 
to succeed.  As economic analyst Rajenthran Armugam stated when 
discussing the need for ASEAN to create economic laws more in 
touch with international norms, “[i]nvariably, failure to do so would 
result in erosion of economic comparative and competitive advantage 
— thus leading to heavy economic loss.70 
Other scholars suggest that the ASEAN states may become more 
inclined to embrace legal institutionalization not only because it is 
 
 65. Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Culture 
Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 13,  20 (2000). 
 66. Id. at 21. 
 67. NARINE, supra note 60, at 31: 
Within ASEAN, conflicts are dealt with by postponing difficult issues, compartmental-
izing an issue so that it does not interfere with other areas of cooperation, and quiet 
diplomacy.  As a result, ASEAN is not capable of resolving many issues of contention 
between its members, but it can move those issues aside so that they do not prevent 
progress in other areas. 
 68. See Davidson, supra  note 61, at 167. 
 69. H.E. Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN and the 3 L’s: Leaders, Laymen, and Lawyers, 
http://www.aseansec.org/17356.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 70. Rajenthran Armugam, Revisiting the Law and Development Paradigm in ASEAN, 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2004-2005  59, 61 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). 
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necessary for the sustainability of free trade agreements, but also be-
cause the rejection of legalism is not as culturally-based as widely be-
lieved.71  As scholar Miles Kahler has argued, “those in ASEAN, re-
ject legalization of regional institutions when it is to their 
disadvantage, not because of culturally distinct approaches to legal-
ism.”72 
B. The Evolving ASEAN Legal Framework 
Beginning with the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was prede-
termined to be non-legalistic.  The Declaration itself was only a po-
litical statement that required no ratification.73  As the current 
ASEAN Secretary-General has described: “[t]he intention was clear: 
the Founding Fathers wanted ASEAN to be just a loosely-organized 
political association with minimum institutionalization, and without 
legal personality or constitutional framework.”74 
ASEAN made its first overtures towards developing a more 
comprehensive legal framework in 1976, nine years after it was 
founded, when the ASEAN member states established the ASEAN 
Secretariat.75  Prior to the ASEAN Secretariat, all coordination 
among ASEAN states had to occur through the secretariats based in 
each member country.  In 1993, the ASEAN Secretariat was again re-
structured.76  Although the ASEAN Secretariat still lacks any real de-
cision-making authority, as described by Paul Davidson, “the evolu-
tion of the Secretariat indicates the maturation of ASEAN as an 
entity and may be considered as an initial step in formalizing the legal 
personality of ASEAN as a corporate entity governed by its own con-
stitution and by-laws.”77 
One of the major limitations preventing ASEAN from using a 
legalistic approach for economic regulation, specifically free trade 
regulation, is ASEAN’s underdeveloped dispute settlement mecha-
nism.  ASEAN never even discussed the possibility of a regional dis-
 
 71. NARINE, supra note 60, at 198. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally Bangkok Declaration, supra  note 36. 
 74. Ong, supra note 66. 
 75. The ASEAN Secretariat was created by the Agreement on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Secretariat (Feb. 24, 1976), ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/1265.htm (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2005).  
 76. See Joint Communique of the Twenty-Sixth Asean Ministerial Meeting (July 23-24, 
1993), ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/2009.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 77. Davidson, supra  note 61, at 169. 
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pute settlement mechanism until nearly ten years after the organiza-
tion was founded.78  However, in 1976, ASEAN developed such a 
mechanism for political disputes with the signing of the Declaration 
of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(Treaty of Amity).  Perhaps the most significant provision of the 
Treaty of Amity is Article 2(d), which requires the “[s]ettlement of 
differences or disputes by peaceful means.”79  Other notable provi-
sions are Articles 14-18, which create a High Council composed of 
representatives from the Southeast Asian member states who are re-
sponsible for resolving all covered disputes.80 
Furthermore, while the Treaty of Amity was originally conceived 
as a legally binding code of conduct for the Southeast Asian coun-
tries, in 1987, the Treaty of Amity was amended to allow non-
ASEAN members to accede to the treaty.81  While New Guinea was 
the first country to ratify the Treaty of Amity, China was the first of 
ASEAN’s major allies to sign this Treaty.82  Currently, key non-
ASEAN members of the Treaty of Amity are: China, India, Japan, 
Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, and New 
Zealand.  Until July 2005, Australia declined the invitation to accede 
to the Treaty of Amity because of potential conflicts with an existing 
alliance with the United States.83  However, Australia’s refusal to sign 
this non-aggression treaty had tangible consequences: until Australia 
indicated that it would sign the treaty, ASEAN was not going to allow 
it to participate in the first East Asian summit to take place in Kuala 
Lampur in December 2005.84  The Treaty of Amity is a noteworthy 
legal framework for its role in East Asian cooperation and as the first 
legally binding non-economic agreement among ASEAN members.85 
 
 78. Id. at 172. 
 79. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Feb. 24, 1976), ASEAN, art. 2(d), 
available at http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).  
 80. Id. arts. 14-18. 
 81. Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Dec. 15, 
1987), ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1218.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 82. China signed the Treaty at the China-ASEAN Summit in October 2003. 
 83. Reuters, Canberra to Sign Asia Peace Pact (July 27, 2005), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/07/27/australia.summit.reut/index.html. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Ong, supra note 69. 
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Additionally, in 2001, ASEAN created rules of procedure for the 
High Council.86  With the Rules of Procedure, the High Council is 
now intended to be a more formalized dispute resolution body that 
can hear political disputes as long as both parties consent.87 
Meanwhile, since 1995, ASEAN has been in the process of de-
veloping a dispute resolution mechanism to resolve economic dis-
putes.  At the 1995 Bangkok Summit, the ASEAN members agreed 
that they would adopt a General Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(“DSM”).  As the ASEAN members stressed, the DSM would have 
jurisdiction to hear “all disputes arising from ASEAN economic 
agreements.”88  A year later, the ASEAN members adopted The Pro-
tocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“1996 Protocol”).89  The 
Preamble of the 1996 Protocol states that it was created in recognition 
of “the need to expand Article 9 of the [Framework] Agreement [on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation] to strengthen the 
mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the area of ASEAN eco-
nomic cooperation.”90  The 1996 Protocol was modeled on the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding.91 
The DSM created by the 1996 Protocol was a significant step for 
the evolution of ASEAN’s legal framework.  Under the 1996 Proto-
col, when an economic dispute arose, and bilateral negotiations and 
mediation attempts had failed, the dispute was to be referred to the 
Senior Economic Officials Meeting (“SEOM”).92  The SEOM was 
then to convene a panel of experts to do the relevant fact-finding.93  
The SEOM’s decision only required a simple majority and not una-
nimity.94  As Davidson notes, the 1996 Protocol’s DSM was quite sig-
nificant as it was “the first formal use of non-consensual decision-
making in ASEAN.”95 
 
 86. Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia (Jul. 23, 2001), ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/3639.htm. (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 87. See id. 
 88. PAUL J. DAVIDSON, ASEAN: THE EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION 147 (2002). 
 89. Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Nov. 20, 1996), ASEAN, available at  
http://www.aseansec.org/16654.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
 90. Id. at Preamble. 
 91. DAVIDSON, supra note 88, at 147. 
 92. See Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, supra note 89, art. 4. 
 93. Id. arts. 4-7. 
 94. Id. art. 7. 
 95. DAVI DSON, supra note 88, at 148. 
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The 1996 Protocol even allowed for appellate review of SEOM 
decisions by the ASEAN Economic Ministers.96  However, the DSM 
created by the 1996 Protocol was never invoked.  When explaining 
why this DSM was never used, ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng 
Yong has stated, “the 1996 Protocol was perceived to be ineffective 
because of its excessive bureaucratic nature, and thus it had never 
been invoked.”97 
Consequently, in 2004, ASEAN created a new Protocol: the 
ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism98 
(“2004 Protocol”).  One of the key differences between the two Pro-
tocols is that under the 2004 Protocol, both government and non-
government officials are involved in resolving the dispute.99 
Moreover, rather than appellate review by the ASEAN Eco-
nomic Ministers, under the 2004 Protocol, appellate review is con-
ducted by experts that are not associated with any government.100  
The purpose of this change according to Secretary-General Ong is to 
settle “trade and economic disputes through objective assessment in-
stead of bureaucratic negotiation.”101  However, the appellate body 
still lacked terms of reference to guide their decision-making.102  Nev-
ertheless, the move of distancing dispute resolution from diplomacy is 
a significant step in the direction of legalism, and stands in direct con-
trast to the 1996 Protocol. 
Another significant change introduced by the 2004 Protocol was 
the creation of the “Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Is-
sues.”  The avowed purpose of this body is to “handle complaints of 
the private sector and operational problems encountered in the im-
plementation of ASEAN economic agreements.”103  As of March 
2005, ASEAN was also trying to create an “ASEAN Compliance 
Body.”104  The purpose of this body would be to “perform a quasi-
 
 96. Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, supra note 86, art. 8. 
 97. Ong, supra note 69. 
 98. ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Nov. 29, 2004), 
ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16754.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).  
 99. See id. art. 12. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Ong, supra note 69. 
 102. This was the case in March 2005. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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judicial function by issuing findings and opinions on non-compliance 
in respect of subject matter before it.”105 
In short, the implementation of DSM is critical to the develop-
ment of an ASEAN legal framework.  In particular, a strong dispute 
resolution mechanism is essential if ACFTA is to succeed.  While the 
DSM created by the 2004 Protocol is a significant improvement over 
the 1996 version, the reader must not forget that ASEAN’s new DSM 
still lacks necessary implementing regulations, and most importantly, 
remains untested. 
Aside from the still developing DSM, there other indicators that 
ASEAN has yet to fully embrace legalism.  In particular, the pivotal 
security agreement—the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea—remains a non-binding document.  In a 2004 
China-ASEAN academic forum, the Chinese participants suggested 
that they were willing to create a binding code of conduct.106  Yet, it 
was the ASEAN members who resisted such legal development: 
“some ASEAN countries are not ready for such a Code of Conduct, 
fearing that it might be ‘too legalistic.’”107  Consequently, as Ralf 
Emmers suggests, the current Declaration is essentially “an interim 
accord.”108  The fear is that ASEAN and China may never be able to 
agree to a legally -binding code of conduct regarding the South China 
Sea.109 
Moreover, Deborah Haas has identified as an impediment to the 
development of an ASEAN legal regime the fact that the ASEAN 
states have varying domestic legal systems: some civil law, some com-
mon law, and some a hybrid of both legal traditions.110  A further hur-
dle to ASEAN’s legal reform is the reality that some ASEAN mem-
bers—particularly Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia—are still in the 
process of establishing a national legal system and finding a legal 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. DEVELOPING ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: REALITIES AND PROSPECTS—A BRIEF 
REPORT ON THE ASEAN  CHINA FORUM 36 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2004). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Ralf Emmers, Keeping Waters Calm in South China Sea, STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, 
at 23. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Deborah Haas, Note, Out of Others’ Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Re-
gional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. POL’Y  809, 862 
(1994). 
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identity.111  Other impediments include “differences in colonial back-
grounds, language, culture, religion, [and] political systems.”112 
IV.  THE INTRA-ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA) AND 
THE RESULTING LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 
In 1967, when ASEAN was created, trade among the member 
nations was minimal.  The ASEAN founding fathers never spoke 
about regional “economic integration.”113  Thus, some of the earliest 
economic agreements were aimed at increasing intra-ASEAN trade. 
In particular, in 1977, ASEAN attempted to develop an intra-
ASEAN free trade area with the establishment of the ASEAN Pref-
erential Trading Arrangements (“PTAs”).114  As Mohammad Ariff 
has described, the PTAs adopted a “cumbersome item-by-item ap-
proach” to reducing trade barriers.115  Consequently, the PTAs failed 
to create free trade amongst the Southeast Asian nations because the 
flexible provisions resulted in each country developing lengthy exclu-
sion lists.116  Instead of free trade, the PTAs created “a rather comical 
free trade in snow plows and other Southeast Asian nonessentials.”117  
Twenty years after the PTAs had been created only five percent of 
intra-ASEAN trade was subject to the reduced tariffs.118  In fact, a 
1987 study of the PTAs revealed that intra-ASEAN trade actua lly 
dropped since the PTAs introduction.119 
Meanwhile, during the 1980s and early 1990s, ASEAN shifted 
some of its attention away from creating its own free trade area to 
 
 111. George O. White, III, Note, From Snowplows to Siopao—Trying to Compete in a 
Global Ma rketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area , 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 177, 192 
(2000). 
 112. Haas,  supra note 106, at 862-63. 
 113. Mohamed Ariff, Trade, Investment and Interdependence , in REINVENTING ASEAN 45, 
46 (Simon S.C. Tay, et al. eds., 2001).  
 114. The PTAs were created by the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrange-
ments (Feb. 24, 1977), ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/1376.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 115. Ariff, supra note 113, at 47. 
 116. Id. 
 117. White, supra  note 111, at 184. 
 118. Michael Haas, ASEAN’s Pivotal Role in Asian-Pacific Regional Cooperation, 3 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 329, 331 (1997). 
 119. Juanjai Ajanant, The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, in ASEAN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT: IMPLICATIONS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13,  15 (Kao Kim Hourn & Sarah Kanter 
eds., 1997). 
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participation in the GATT and Uruguay Round negotiations.120  
However, after the Uruguay Round, ASEAN began to tackle the is-
sue of free trade once again.  As Michael Haas suggests, the com-
bined effect of Europe’s Maastrict Treaty in 1991 and the 1992 North 
American Free Trade Agreement left ASEAN worrying about the 
access to Western markets.121  ASEAN began to feel that it would 
need to create a similar regime in order to compete in the global 
marketplace.  In particular, ASEAN’s leaders were concerned that: 
“they were being bypassed by their relaxed approach to regional co-
operation.”122 
In 1992, ASEAN adopted the Framework Agreement on En-
hancing Economic Cooperation123 (“AFTA Framework Agree-
ment”).  The AFTA Framework Agreement was adopted at the 1992 
Singapore Summit after the completion of a study analyzing the po-
tential for deeper economic cooperation among the ASEAN member 
states.  As the full name of the AFTA Framework Agreement sug-
gests, the document does not set out detailed implementing instruc-
tions but rather is a general framework listing plans for deepening 
economic cooperation among the ASEAN states.  Article 2(A) is the 
most relevant provision of this Framework Agreement as it contains 
the plan to create an intra-ASEAN Free Trade Area (“AFTA”).124 
While the Framework Agreement sets out the basic policies for 
further economic cooperation, the mechanism for actually achieving 
AFTA is the “Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tar-
iff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area” (“CEPT Scheme”).  
When created, AFTA and the CEPT Scheme called for the reduction 
of tariff rates to between zero and five percent by 2008.  The target 
date was later pushed up to 2003 and then again to 2002.  According 
to ASEAN, as of 2004, the six original CEPT members had met this 
goal with respect to more than 99% of the products on the CEPT in-
 
 120. H. S. Kartadjoemena, ASEAN and the International Trading System: Regional Trade 
Arrangement vs. the WTO, in ASEAN BEYOND THE REGIONAL CRISIS: CHALLENGES AND 
INITIATIVES 203, 218 (Mya Than ed., 2001). 
 121. Haas,  supra note 118, at 331. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (Jan. 28, 1992), 
ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1165.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 124. Id. art. 2(a)(1). 
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clusion list.125  The newest members of ASEAN are still in process of 
implementing the CEPT scheme and have varying target dates.126 
Although ASEAN’s official website promotes AFTA as a suc-
cess,127 other scholars have described ASEAN’s progress towards 
AFTA as a “struggle.”128  As Peofilo C. Daquila notes, the Asian Fi-
nancial Crisis in 1997 was particularly problematic for AFTA, as it 
distracted the ASEAN countries from implementing their AFTA ob-
ligations.129  Hence, because Singapore became frustrated by the pace 
of AFTA, it began to seek out its FTAs with non-ASEAN coun-
tries.130 
One of the reasons that the realization of AFTA has been slow is 
that compliance with tariff reductions has consistently been achieved 
through bargaining processes and the ratification of new protocols.  
Thus, while the slow pace of AFTA has been frustrating to certain 
ASEAN member nations, the process suggests that ASEAN is indeed 
moving towards greater legal institutionalization.  In particular, since 
1995, AFTA-related protocols have become more legalistic, formal, 
and detailed.131 
V.  KEY GEOPOLITICAL HURDLES TO ACFTA’S SUCCESS 
A. Lack of Cohesion in ASEAN 
In the few years since the ACFTA plan was unveiled, the 
ASEAN states have indicated that they may not be ready for such a 
legal agreement because of their continued inability to function as a 
unit.  At a 2004 China-ASEAN academic forum, some scholars noted 
that ASEAN needed to “better synchronize its moves towards 
[ACFTA] or CAFTA.”132  Indeed, the inability of the ASEAN states 
 
 125. ASEAN,  TRADE, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12021.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 
2005). 
 126. Id.  Because they joined ASEAN later, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia have 
later target dates.  Vietnam’s target date is 2006, Laos’ and Myanmar’s is 2008, while Cambodia 
has until 2010. 
 127. See generally Official Website of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, AFTA, 
http://www.aseansec.org/12025.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
 128. Peofilo C. Daquila & Le Huu Huy, Singapore and ASEAN in the Global Economy: The 
Case of Free Trade Agreements, ASIAN SURV. 908, 912 (2003).  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. HELEN E. S. NESADURAI, GLOBALISATION, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND REGIONALISM: 
THE ASEAN  FREE TRADE AREA 163-64 (2003). 
 132. Kesavapany, supra  note 12, at 26. 
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to negotiate the EHP tariff reductions multilaterally does not bode 
well for their future ability to function multilaterally. 
Moreover, ASEAN’s inability to negotiate as a single body with 
China on other matters may prove to be problematic for ACFTA.  
For example, as described earlier, with respect to the Spratly Islands 
dispute, one of the reasons China and ASEAN were not able to de-
velop a legally -binding code of conduct but instead adopted a political 
declaration is because the ASEAN members could not work collec-
tively.133  Because the ASEAN members were not able to reach con-
sensus with respect to the dispute, ASEAN as an organization was 
weakened in negotiations with China.134 
The Spratly Islands dispute certainly differs from ACFTA to the 
extent that not all ASEAN members have legal claims to the  Spratly 
islands; hence since the ASEAN members’ interests in the dispute 
vary significantly, China has been able to divide up the ASEAN 
members and negotiate bilaterally.  However, the importance of 
ACFTA to each ASEAN member may differ significantly according 
to its state of development and export structure.  Hence, for ACFTA 
to be most effective, and so that ASEAN has sufficient weight at the 
bargaining table, the ASEAN members must work collectively to-
ward the goal of establishing ACFTA. 
B. Competition between ASEAN and China 
If from an economic viewpoint China and ASEAN are primarily 
competitors, ACFTA may prove unsuccessful.  At a 2004 China-
ASEAN academic forum, one Thai participant noted “[t]he economic 
initiatives of China cannot erase the fact that China and most of the 
ASEAN states are competitors in the export market.”135 
Some scholars have suggested that the competitive nature of the 
ASEAN-Chinese relationship is demonstrated by the reality that 
China and ASEAN are not each other’s major export markets.136  As 
John Wong and Sarah Chan articulate, the export levels between 
China and ASEAN suggest that their trade structures are fundamen-
tally competitive rather than complementary.  Both sides are eco-
nomically oriented toward the industrialized countries of the West 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Emmers, supra note 108. 
 135. Kesavapany, supra  note 12, at 30. 
 136. See, e.g., Wong & Chen, supra  note 20, at 517. 
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and Japan.”137  The United States remains ASEAN’s main trading 
partner.  In 2001, while trade between ASEAN and China was $55.4 
billion, trade between ASEAN nations and the United States was 
$120 billion.138  Hence, as Vincent Wei-cheng Wang writes, “although 
increasing trade and investment ties have increased the economic in-
terdependence between China and ASEAN, these relationships are 
still trailing the region’s economic relationships with the United 
States, although the gap is narrowing.”139 
Therefore, because the ASEAN and Chinese economies are not 
“complementary,” the ASEAN member states will compete with 
China for exports to developed countries.  This competition may oc-
cur for both traditional and non-traditional manufactured goods.140 
Furthermore, tensions between ASEAN and China have in-
creased due to the perception that China is diverting investment away 
from ASEAN.  “Although the decline of ASEAN-bound FDI [For-
eign Direct Investment] has been overstated, the perception in 
Southeast Asia is nevertheless that FDI is having a ‘hollow out effect’ 
and this perception has contributed to a growing sense of threat 
across much of the Southeast Asian region.”141  In 2002, China’s FDI 
inflows reached $53 billion, while all of the ASEAN members com-
bined received only $14 billion.142 
VI.  ACFTA, THE WTO, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN 
A. ACFTA and the WTO 
In theory, ACFTA is intended to be WTO-consistent.143  Within 
the ACFTA Framework Agreement, there are eight references to the 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Wang, supra  note 3, at 31. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Wong & Chen, supra note 20, at 519-21 (“In the area of traditional labor-extensive in-
dustries like textiles, clothing, and footwear, China’s gains have come at the expense of 
ASEAN.”).  Authors also note that in the area of non-traditional and more capital intensive-
manufactures such as manufacturers of computers, printers, disk drives etc., ASEAN has been 
negatively impacted by the growth of exports of these non-traditional goods from China to the 
world market.  See id. 
 141. Kesavapany , supra note 12, at 30. 
 142. Denis Hew, Regional Economic Trends, in ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2004-2005  46, 47 (In-
stitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). 
 143. Yu, supra note 21, at 54 (“In theory, any WTO member’s regulations and state activ i-
ties rela ting to trade have to comply with WTO rules.”). 
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WTO.144  However, ACFTA is also symbolic of a growing movement 
toward regionalism that is seemingly at odds with the WTO/GATT-
led international trading system.  As Wang Jiang Yu notes: “By defi-
nition, regionalism is at odd[s] with the MFN clause and the drafts-
men of the GATT and WTO were aware of this; they created several 
exceptions for RTAs [regional trading agreements].”145 
Moreover, some scholars have suggested that ACFTA’s technical 
compliance with the WTO rules is not surprising since generally 
RTAs (regional trade arrangements) are WTO-consistent.146  As at 
least one commentator has noted, RTAs are usually found to be con-
sistent because “the requirements of Article XXIV and the Enabling 
Clause and GATS are very weak and have never been enforced.”147 
Indeed, the resurgence of regionalism itself may demonstrate the 
many weaknesses of the current WTO multilateral trading system.  
The failure of global trade talks in the past couple of years has argua-
bly led to the recent proliferation of negotiations for bilateral and re-
gional free trade agreements.  Even the United States has sought out 
new FTAs.148  However, merely because many powerful nations are 
negotiating FTAs does not mean that the WTO has become insignifi-
cant.  Furthermore, because ACFTA’s success is far from guaranteed, 
and because the WTO still provides many benefits that ACFTA likely 
cannot provide, China and ASEAN must ensure that ACFTA is a 
“building block” and not a “stumbling block” with respect to the 
WTO.149 
Meanwhile, even if ACFTA and China’s newfound embracement 
of regionalism is not a direct threat to the WTO, ACFTA’s creation 
will likely significantly affect the world trading system.  Even before 
the creation of ACFTA, scholars noted ASEAN’s potential to con-
 
 144. See Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between 
ASEAN and People’s Republic of China, supra note 26, arts. 1-3, 7-9, 11-12, 14.  Additionally, 
one of the paragraphs of the Preamble states, “REAFFIRMING the rights, obligations and un-
dertakings of the respective parties under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and other 
multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements and arrangements.” 
 145. Yu, supra  note 21, at 55. 
 146. See id. for comments regarding regional trading agreements and their compliance with 
WTO rules. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Most notable is the July 2005 passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement. 
 149. Sellakumaran, supra note 34, at 52-54; see also Yu, supra note 21, at 68 (noting that 
leading trade powers such as China have the responsibility to ensure that regionalism serves as 
“building blocks” for multilateral trade liberalization).  
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siderably influence WTO and GATT negotiations in future years.150  
Moreover, with China’s rising economic status and recent entry to the 
WTO, WTO-watchers should anticipate seeing China significantly in-
fluence the making of WTO rules in years to come.151  Furthermore, 
keeping in mind China’s interest in influencing the making of WTO 
rules, the desirability of ACFTA is more evident: “by embracing an 
FTA, China is anticipating that ASEAN in the ACFTA will lend sup-
port to China in rule-making.  In other words, the ACFTA is ex-
pected to enhance China’s balancing power in the making of rules in 
international fora.”152 
B. ACFTA’s impact on the United States and Japan 
There is little doubt that the United States and other economic 
powers with significant influence in East Asia will be affected as 
China gains more influence over ASEAN through ACFTA: “[t]he 
pact between regional giant China and the [ten] nations aims to drop 
most tariffs over the next five years in a move some analysts have said 
is a sign Beijing may be moving to undercut America’s vast influence 
over the region.”153 
Japan, as another superpower with considerable influence in 
East Asia, has already taken concrete action in response to ACFTA.  
Even before ACFTA officially commenced in July 2005, the plan for 
ACFTA prompted Japan to seek a closer relationship with 
ASEAN.154  As indicated in a recent Japanese editorial, Japan’s re-
sponse to ACFTA has been to act quickly out of fear of being edged 
out by China.155  In a July 19, 2005 editorial in The Daily Yoimuri, a 
Tokyo-based newspaper, the commentator noted that Japan “should 
do all it can to make progress in FTA talks with ASEAN nations.”156 
 
 150. See, e.g., Thomas Fischer, A Commentary on Regional Institutions in the Pacific Rim: 
Do APEC and ASEAN Still Matter? , 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 337,  379 (2003). 
 151. Qingjiang Kong, supra  note 5, at 845 (“In a nutshell, China has voiced the following 
approaches to WTO rules: honouring its own commitments, using WTO rules to its own advan-
tage, and actively participating in the making of new rules.”) 
 152. Id. 
 153. CNN, New Zealand Looks at ASEAN Security Treaty , Dec. 1, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/12/01/laos.asean/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 
2005). 
 154. Wang, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that the ACFTA is causing some concerns in Japan, 
which has led to a new emphasis on developing a closer relationship with ASEAN.  As Wang 
states, “Interestingly, some analysts view Japan’s new emphasis on fostering closer relations 
with ASEAN as being driven by one major consideration—not to be outdone by China.”). 
 155. Japan Needs Trade Pact with ASEAN, DAILY YOMIURI , July 19, 2005, at 4. 
 156. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
As highlighted in Part IV, the long-term success of ACFTA will 
depend on ASEAN’s ability to adopt more legalistic measures, par-
ticularly an enhanced dispute settlement mechanism.  While the 2004 
Protocol is a significant step in the development of an ASEAN DSM, 
it is too early to judge whether it will be sufficiently more successful 
than the ASEAN DSM created under the 1996 Protocol.  As the 
reader will recall, the DSM was never utilized under the 1996 Proto-
col.  Hence, ASEAN’s significant inexperience with a DSM could 
prove to be problematic for the success of ACFTA, which will require 
a sufficiently institutionalized DSM.  Moreover, not only has 
ASEAN’s development of its own DSM been slow, but the ASEAN 
states who are members of the WTO have been relatively inactive in 
using the WTO dispute settlement system.157  Whether or not this is 
the result of a persistent reluctance towards using legalistic ap-
proaches or is due to other unrelated factors, overall the ASEAN 
members are novices with respect to international economic dispute 
settlement systems. 
In contrast, the development of an intra-ASEAN free trade area 
described in Part V bodes well for the future success of ACFTA.  The 
progress already made with this intra-ASEAN free trade area dem-
onstrates that six of the ASEAN states are capable of reducing tariffs 
in line with required targets.  However, because the four newer 
ASEAN members were not required to fully implement the intra-
ASEAN free trade area in the same timeframe as the elder members, 
it is too early to judge whether these less-developed nations will be 
able to maintain their commitment to free trade. 
Regardless of whether ACFTA succeeds in the long-term, 
ASEAN’s and China’s commitment to this endeavour is significant.  
In particular, if there is one lesson to be derived from the ACFTA 
experience it is how China’s economic rise has the potential to pro-
foundly affect other nations’ legal development.  Whether or not 
ACFTA is, as some have suggested, the only method for dealing with 
China’s ascendancy, it is clear that ASEAN has recognized the press-
ing nature of the “China question” and is responding to it through 
economic, geopolitical, and, most importantly, related legal reform.  
Indeed, ACFTA can also be seen as China’s legal response to its 
 
 157. See Nohyoung Park, Overview of the State of WTO Dispute Settlement Involving the 
ASEAN+3, in WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 241, 244 (Mitsuo Matsushita & Duk-
geun Ahn eds., 2004). 
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growing economic prowess both as a method of engaging its 
neighbours in a “win-win situation” and as a means to influence the 
formation of international economic rules.  What remains to be seen, 
however, is how other nations such as the United States will respond 
to China as it continues to grow as an economic superpower. 
